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THE NEW UNIFORM HEALTH CARE DECISIONS ACT:
PAVING A HEALTH CARE DECISIONS
SUPERHIGHWAY?.
CHARLES P. SABATINO*
INTRODUCTION
Advance directive statutes have become a familiar component of
state legislation since 1976 when California enacted the first "living
will" statute.1 Today, every state has one or more health care deci-
sions statutes relating to living wills, health care powers of attorney,
and other forms of surrogate decisionmaking. All seek to provide a
clear pathway for personal control over health care decisionmaking.2
With few exceptions, however, these laws suffer two significant flaws.
First, they lack comprehensiveness, addressing only narrow areas of
the issue; and second, they are tortuous in formality and procedure.3
In 1985, the Uniform Law Commissioners released the Uniform
Rights of the Terminally Ill Act (URTIA),' hoping to interject some
order and simplicity into the picture. Unfortunately, URTIA made
only modest progress and failed to offer a simple and comprehensive
scheme for decisionmaking.5
In August 1993, after two years of drafting, the Uniform Law
Commissioners approved the entirely new Uniform Health Care Deci-
sions Act (UHCDA) to replace URTIA.6 The American Bar Associa-
* Assistant Director, American Bar Association, Commission on Legal Problems of
the Elderly; Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University Law Center.
1. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1994) (establishing spe-
cific provisions through the Natural Death Act).
2. See generally Choice in Dying, Inc., RIGHT-TO-DIE L. DIG. (Dec. 1993 Supp.) (track-
ing developments in health care decisionmaking legislation in every state).
3. See David M. English, The UPC and the New DurabLe Powers, 27 REAL PROP., PROBATE,
& TRuSTJ. 333, 336 (1992) (noting that "[u]niformity, an important goal for . . . health
powers, is now only a mirage.").
4. UNIFORM RGrrs OF THE TERMINALLY ILL AcT (1985).
5. Even after the Commissioners added a provision in 1989 for appointing a proxy,
URTIA remained a fairly narrow pathway for health care decisionmaking. See UNIFORM
RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL Acr §§ 2, 7 (1989).
6. UNIFORM HEALTH CARE DECISIONS Acr (1993) (the Act superseded the Commis-
sioners' Model Health-Care Consent Act (1982), the Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill
Act (1985), and the Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act (1989)) [hereinafter
UHCDA].
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tion endorsed the new Act in February 1994." In contrast to the
narrowness of URTIA, UHCDA strives to pave a health care decision-
making superhighway. This Article describes UHCDA from the point
of view of one observer/advisor who had the opportunity to follow the
drafting committee's work in progress. It begins with an overview of
the basic assumptions underlying the Act and then provides a selective
tour of the Act's more important provisions.
I. BAsic ASSUMPTIONS
Three fundamental goals drive nearly every provision of the
UHCDA: (1) recognition of individual autonomy; (2) comprehen-
siveness of decisionmaking options; and (3) simplicity consistent with
the way individuals and health care providers actually operate. The
drafting committee acted upon these goals to an extent unprece-
dented in current state legislation. The result is a model act that pro-
vides a serious new benchmark for state legislation rather than a
rehash of provisions already common in state law.
A. Individual Autonomy
To encourage individual autonomy, the drafters disposed of
nearly all restrictions on and preconditions for the operation of ad-
vance directives. Thus, an individual may dictate various instruc-
tions-regarding treatment wishes or naming an agent for health care
decisionmaking-in whatever terms or form the individual chooses.'
Execution requirements such as witnessing are absent.9 Also absent
are preconditions such as certification of diagnosis of a terminal con-
dition or permanent unconsciousness, the need for life-sustaining
procedures, and special rules for nutrition and hydration or preg-
nancy. This unencumbered approach keeps the focus of decision-
making where it should be-on discerning what the patient meant by
his or her words and instructions, even if they are less than clear,
rather than on what the legislature meant by its terms and
instructions.
B. Comprehensiveness
The current condition of state health care decisions legislation is
fragmented, incomplete, and often inconsistent, both among the
7. American Bar Association, Recommendation 115B, Reports with Recommendations to
the House of Delegates (Feb. 1994).
8. See infra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
9. See UHCDA § 4.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
states and even within states.' ° The UHCDA drafters sought to com-
bat this confusion by providing a comprehensive statutory scheme.
The UHCDA covers in a single statute all forms of advance directives,
as well as decisionmaking in the absence of an advance directive. The
Act stops short, however, on three important matters. First, it does
not address surrogate decisionmaking for minors, although it does
cover emancipated minors.11 Second, it does not clearly address deci-
sionmaking in the absence of both an advance directive and a surro-
gate authorized under the Act. Finally, it does not expressly address
the operation of advance directives in the context of emergency medi-
cal services in the home and community.
1. Minors.-As to minors, the drafters concluded: "The subject
of consent for treatment of minors is a complex one which in many
states is covered by a variety of statutes and is therefore left to other
state law." 1" This explanation, however, is equally persuasive as an ar-
gument for why a uniform act should apply to minors. For example,
the Illinois Health Care Surrogate Act" covers decisionmaking for
adults and minors in a single statute. 4 As a practical matter, it is a
formidable and complex challenge to cover the full range of possible
health care decisions, parental and custodial arrangements, and levels
of maturity of minors under one act. The drafting committee wisely
left it to another day. Nevertheless, it is up to the Uniform Law Com-
missioners to make sure that the issue is not lost. A separate uniform
act on health care decisionmaking for minors should be seriously
considered.
2. No Advance Directive or Surrogate. -As to decisionmaking in the
absence of both an advance directive and a natural surrogate, the time
may not be ripe for a national model. There are simply no viable
models or innovative precedents in place to draw from, other than
resorting to guardianship. t 5
3. Emergency Medical Services.-The Act's principles certainly ap-
ply in concept to emergency medical services. However, special proto-
cols and protections are needed to enable emergency medical services
10. See English, supra note 3, at 336.
11. See UHCDA § 2(a).
12. Id. § 5(a) cmt.
13. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 755, paras. 40/1 to /55 (Smith-Hurd 1992).
14. However, the Act focuses solely on decisions to terminate life support under nar-
rowly defined circumstances. Id.
15. A guardian's authority to make health care decisions is determined by the terms of
the judicial appointment. See UHCDA § 1(4) cmt.
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personnel to withhold resuscitation in emergencies. Because state leg-
islators have only just begun to address this situation through legisla-
tion and regulation, the drafters concluded that it was premature to
codify protocols or guidelines in model legislation."6
C. Simplicity
Simplicity is evident throughout UHCDA, especially in the Act's
relative brevity and in the elimination of formalities for the execution
of advance directives. Without the commentary, the Act is barely 3500
words, or about half the length of the 1993 Maryland Health Care
Decisions Act.17 Predictably, some will criticize the Act for dismissing
widely used formalities such as witnessing protocols and witness re-
strictions. However, the drafters were motivated by the fact that less
than twenty percent of the adult public has made use of advance di-
rectives, despite their nearly twenty years of existence. 8 If the formali-
ties and other protective measures discourage the majority of adults
from using advance directives, then their value is doubtful at best.
II. SEcTiON 1-DEFINITIONS
Seventeen definitions comprise section 1 of the Act. Most are
familiar, but many have benefited from a fair amount of streamlining.
The Act uses the term "advance health-care directive" as a generic
term covering both an "individual instruction" and a "power of attor-
ney for health care." 9 The term "health care" is sweeping in scope,
meaning "any care, treatment, service, or procedure to maintain, diag-
nose, or otherwise affect an individual's physical or mental condi-
tion." 2  A "health-care decision" reiterates this broad sweep and
16. The first state laws addressing the recognition of do-not-resuscitate orders in the
context of emergency medical services appeared in 1991 in New York, N.Y. PUB. HEALTH
LAW §§ 2960-2979 (McKinney 1993), and Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111- para. 5510.3
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992). As ofJanuary 1994, seventeen states had enacted some form of
legislation on this topic, generally authorizing a state agency, usually the health depart-
ment, to develop protocols. See Choice In Dying, Inc., Statutes Authorizing Do-Not-Resuscitate
Orders, RIGHT-TO-DIE L. Di. (Dec. 1993) (setting forth an updated listing of such
legislation).
17. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §§ 5-601 to -618 (1994).
18. E.g., Linda L. Emanuel et al., Advance Directives for Medical Care-A Case for Greater
Use, 324 NEw ENG.J. MED. 889, 889 (1991) (noting that advance directives are infrequently
used despite their wide endorsement); Linda L. Emanuel & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, The Medi-
cal Directive: A New Comprehensive Advance Care Document, 261 JAMA 3288 (1989).
19. UHCDA § 1(1).
20. Id. § 1(5).
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expressly includes the selection and discharge of providers as well as
directions regarding artificial nutrition and hydration.21
There are three possible decisionmakers for an individual who
lacks "capacity": an "agent" designated in a power of attorney;2 2 a
"guardian" who has been granted authority by the court to make
health care decisions; 23 and a "surrogate," who is any one of several
default family or friend decisionmakers identified in section 5 of the
Act.
2 4
"Capacity" is defined as "an individual's ability to understand the
significant benefits, risks, and alternatives to proposed health care and
to make and communicate a health-care decision."25 This definition
strives to keep capacity determinations situation-specific, rather than
global, by focusing on one particular health care decision at a time. A
separate section of the Act establishes a rebuttable presumption of
capacity and reiterates the preeminent right of an individual to make
health care decisions while having capacity to do so. 26
A novel term used in the Act is that of "supervising health-care
provider" which means "the primary physician or, if there is no pri-
mary physician or the primary physician is not reasonably available,
the health care provider who has undertaken primary responsibility
for an individual's health care."2 7 The term ensures that someone
with authority can assume responsibility for certain matters when the
primary physician is unavailable. Such matters include responding to
revocations of advance directives under section 3, accepting the oral
designation of a surrogate by a patient under section 5, informing the
patient of a surrogate decision before implementing it under section
7, and documenting information in the medical record regarding a
patient's advance directives or surrogate, as required by section 7.21
21. See id. § 1(6) (i), (iii). A "health-care decision" also includes "approval or disap-
proval of diagnostic tests, surgical procedures, programs of medication, and orders not to
resuscitate." Id. § 1(6) (ii).
22. Id. § 1 (2).
23. Id. § 1(4).
24. See id. § 1(17) & cmt. By including a guardian as one of three possible deci-
sionmakers, the Act clearly downplays the use of guardianship and seeks to keep decision-
making out of the courts absent a real controversy.
25. Id. § 1(3).
26. See id. § 11.
27. Id. § 1(16).
28. See id. § 1(16) cmt.
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III. SECTION 2-ADVANCE HEALTH CARE DiREcrVEs
This compact section sets forth nearly all the operating principles
for advance directives under the Act.
A. Individual Instruction
One of the most significant departures from the prevailing ap-
proach is the provision of an "individual instruction." 29 The term re-
places the more limited, stand-alone concept of a "living will." Unlike
living wills, which are typically limited to end-of-life decisions, an "in-
struction" may relate to any aspect of one's health care under any cir-
cumstances that the maker chooses to specify.3 Another important
difference is that an instruction may be oral as well as written."1
Written instructions may be in any form and require no witnesses
or other formality, although the sample advance directive form in sec-
tion 4 encourages the use of witnesses.32 Oral instructions are likewise
free of any required formalities except that a supervising health care
provider must record an oral instruction in the medical record.33 By
recognizing oral instructions, the Act affirms the legitimacy and value
of direct communication between doctor and patient. Unfortunately,
this policy dissipates the incentive to create a formal directive. "Why
bother, if I can just tell my physician?" In addition, although an oral
instruction is recorded by the doctor in the medical record, it is un-
likely that such notes will be as readily recognizable or as portable as a
separate, formal instruction. Thus, oral instructions may be lost in the
system or misinterpreted by the ultimate decisionmaker.
B. Agent
Section 2(b) establishes a person's broad power to delegate to an
agent, under a power of attorney for health care, the authority "to
make any health-care decision the principal could have made while
having capacity."34 Unlike the individual instruction, the power of at-
torney must be in writing and signed by the individual.3" No witness-
ing or other formality is required. In the name of simplicity and
personal autonomy, the drafters had considered eliminating any limi-
tations whatsoever on the choice of agent. After considerable deliber-
29. Id. § 2(a).
30. Id.
31. See id.
32. Id.
33. Id. § 7(b).
34. Id. § 2(b).
35. Id.
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ation, however, they concluded that persons in long-term care
residential settings were uniquely vulnerable and in need of special
protection against decisionmakers who could have a fundamental
conflict of interest by virtue of their connection to the institution.
Thus, unless related to the principal by blood, marriage, or adoption,
section 2(b) precludes owners, operators, or employees of residential
long-term health care institutions from serving as agents. 3 6
C. Orally Designated Surrogate
The welcome simplicity of the power of attorney for health care is
unfortunately confounded by a concept that underlies section 5 of the
Act. Specifically, section 5(b) authorizes an individual to "designate
any individual to act as surrogate by personally informing the supervis-
ing health-care provider."37 The orally designated surrogate has deci-
sionmaking priority over all others when there is no advance directive
or guardian authorized to make health care decisions.3"
There may be little difference between an orally designated surro-
gate and an agent under a written power of attorney. They are both,
at heart, agency relationships. However, the oral designation is not
treated as such under the Act's definitions,39 perhaps because the law
frowns upon the notion of an oral power of attorney. Yet, under the
Act, only three differences are apparent between the two. First, an
agent under a written power of attorney for health care has priority
over an orally designated surrogate.4 ° Second, the authority of an
orally designated surrogate is trumped by a guardian."a This is not so
with an agent's authority, unless the court expressly authorizes the
guardian to override the agent.42 Third, when an orally designated
surrogate assumes authority, the surrogate has a duty to communicate
this fact to the patient's spouse, adult children, parents, and brothers
and sisters "who can be readily contacted."43 The agent has no such
duty.
Inclusion of the orally designated surrogate may be commended
as a serious attempt to acknowledge the way decisions are actually
made. It is far more likely that a patient will say, "Doc, if anything
36. See id. § 2(b).
37. Id. § 5(b).
38. See id.
39. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
40. See UHCDA § 5(a).
41. Id.
42. Id. § 6(a), (b).
43. Id. § 5(d).
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happens to me, talk to my daughter, Mary. I trust her," than for the
patient to execute a written power of attorney. On the other hand,
the oral designation causes the same problems that an oral instruction
causes, only worse. It has always been difficult to explain powers of
attorney for health care to the general public and to convince people
to use them. With an orally designated surrogate in the picture, the
explanation of those vehicles becomes doubly confusing, and the ar-
guments for using them less convincing. The response is likely to be,
"Why bother using a written power, when I can simply mention my
choice of decisionmaker to my doctor on the morning of surgery?"
D. Triggers
The individual has the right to specify when an advance directive
becomes effective and how trigger conditions, if any, are to be deter-
mined.4 4 If the individual provides no alternative direction, then a
power of attorney for health care becomes effective upon the person's
loss of capacity as determined by the primary physician.4 5 No concur-
rence or other secondary opinions are required.
E. Standard for Decisionmaking
A standard for decisionmaking first appears in subsection (e), ap-
plicable to an agent.4 6 The agent must follow the principal's instruc-
tions and other expressed wishes to the extent known to the agent.
Otherwise, the agent must act in the principal's best interest as deter-
mined by the agent, taking into account the principal's "personal values"
to the extent known to the agent.4 7 The drafters chose not to develop
a set of required factors for determining "best interest" because they
believed it more patient-centered to grant the agent "discretion to as-
certain and weigh the factors likely to be of importance to the
principal."4 8
F Court Involvement
The drafters intended to keep most health care decisions out of
court. Subsection (f) states simply: "A health-care decision made by
44. See id. § 2(c), (d).
45. Id.
46. See id. § 2(e). A standard for decisionmaking appears again in § 5(f), applicable to
surrogates, and again indirectly in § 6(a), applicable to guardians.
47. See id. § 2(e).
48. Id. § 2(e) cmt. The decision not to enumerate factors for determining 'best inter-
est' contrasts markedly to the approach used in the 1993 Maryland Health Care Decisions
Act which enumerates seven factors. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-601 (e) (1994).
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an agent for a principal is effective without judicial approval."49 Sec-
tion 2 (g) permits an individual to nominate a guardian of the person
in any written advance directive. 0 The comment to the subsection
states the drafters' hope that "the mere nomination of the agent [as
guardian] will reduce the likelihood that a guardianship could be used
to thwart the agent's authority."51
G. Out-of-State Directives
The final principle established in section 2 concerns the validity
of out-of-state advance directives and directives made prior to the date
of enactment.52 Such concerns arise under most advance directive
legislation because of wide variations in required formalities or other
rules. Under the UHCDA, the concerns are virtually eliminated be-
cause formalities and restrictive rules are almost nonexistent. Section
2(h) simply states that if a directive complies with the Act, then the
directive is valid no matter where or when executed. 3
IV. SECTION 3-REvoCATION
Having decided to recognize maximum flexibility in creating ad-
vance directives, the drafters faced a conundrum in formulating rules
for revocation. If they applied the same flexibility to revocation, rec-
ognizing any expression of an intent to revoke as valid, then the au-
thority of a written directive could be undermined by anyone's oral
claim that the individual had revoked the directive. To meet the chal-
lenge, the drafters established two rules under section 3. First, an
agent's designation under a power of attorney may be revoked only by
"a signed writing or by personally informing the supervising health-
care provider."54 The same rule applies to the revocation of an orally
designated surrogate.55 Second, for all other advance directives, writ-
ten or oral, any action "that communicates an intent to revoke" is suf-
ficient to effect a revocation.56 Section 3 also sets forth the duty of
interested parties to communicate the fact of revocation to health
49. UHCDA § 2(f). The same principle of decisionmaking without judicial approval
reappears in § 5(g) with respect to surrogates, and in § 6(c) with respect to guardians.
50. See id. § 2(g).
51. Id. § 2(g) cmt.
52. Id. § 2(h).
53. Id.
54. Id. § 3(a).
55. See id. § 5(h).
56. Id. § 3(b).
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care providers, revocation as a matter of law by divorce or legal separa-
tion, and partial revocations.5 7
V. SECTION 4-OTIONAL FoRM
Section 4 provides a single, multipurpose advance directive form
that is entirely optional. The drafters' goals of simplicity and compre-
hensiveness met their toughest test in this section because the goals
compel contradictory approaches to form drafting-one, brevity, and
the other, great detail.5"
The form has four parts. Individuals may use any or all of the
four parts and may modify or supplement them as they wish. Part one
designates an agent under a power of attorney for health care. Part
two allows the individual to give instructions about the individual's
health care, focusing primarily on end-of-life decisions.59 Two basic
end-of-life options are offered in paragraph six of the form:
(a) Choice Not To Prolong Life
I do not want my life to be prolonged if (i) I have an
incurable and irreversible condition that will result in my
death within a relatively short time, (ii) I become uncon-
scious and, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, I will
not regain consciousness, or (iii) the likely risks and burdens
of treatment would outweigh the expected benefits, OR
(b) Choice To Prolong Life
I want my life to be prolonged as long as possible within
the limits of generally accepted health-care standards.' °
The next paragraph allows individuals to refine their instruction
one step further by specifically addressing nutrition and hydration:
Artificial nutrition and hydration must be provided, with-
held, or withdrawn in accordance with the choice I have
made in paragraph (6) unless I mark the following box. If I
mark this box [ ], artificial nutrition and hydration must be
provided regardless of my condition and regardless of the
choice I have made in paragraph (6).61
57. Id. § 3(c), (d).
58. See id. § 4. While the form is more readable than most of its statutory brethren, it
unfortunately was not subjected to a formal reading level evaluation, a process that should
be routine in all advance directive drafting.
59. Id. Check-list approaches to end-of-life instructions inevitably cause concern about
whether individuals really know what they are saying when they initial the boxes. This
form raises the same concerns, although it fares better than most.
60. Id. § 4, 6.
61. Id. § 4, 1 7.
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Paragraph (8) of the form accommodates any special instructions
about pain relief, with the default instruction dictating that "treat-
ment for alleviation of pain or discomfort be provided at all times,
even if it hastens my death."6 2 The final paragraph invites any supple-
mental or substitute instructions, noting that the writer may add addi-
tional sheets of paper if needed.63
Part three provides an opportunity to express an intention to do-
nate bodily organs and tissues at death. The drafters' decision to in-
clude this component recognizes that anatomical gift designations are
essentially another form of advance directive and merit inclusion, or
at least consideration, in a comprehensive health care instruction.
Nevertheless, part three further illustrates the difficulty of creating a
universal form. The Patient Self-Determination Act64 requires most
providers to give patients information about advance directives at the
stressful time of admission to a health care facility.65 Some providers,
hospitals in particular, are especially reluctant to provide patients with
an advance directive form that asks not only for instructions about
terminating treatment, but also for permission to harvest their organs.
Such a form may give the wrong impression at the wrong time.
The simple answer to those providers is to change the form. The
Act is emphatic about the right to modify the form or use any other
form of advance directive.66 The simple answer, however, must be
tempered by the fact that statutory forms tend to become fixed reali-
ties with an identity and a life of their own that is resistant to change.
Part four of the form provides a space for the individual to desig-
nate a primary physician, and an alternate, if the individual wishes to
do so.6 This provision is rare among most statutory forms today, but
was viewed by the drafters as an important component of the decision-
making options over which the individual may exercise control.
VI. SECTION 5-DECISIONS BY SURROGATE
Section 5 provides a legal framework for health care decisionmak-
ing on behalf of patients who lack advance directives and guardians.
62. Id. § 4,18.
63. Id. § 4,19.
64. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
65. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(f) (1988 & Supp. V 1992).
66. The prefatory language to the optional form in the UHCDA § 4 states: "The fol-
lowing form may, but need not, be used to create an advance health-care directive .... An
individual may complete or modify all or any part of the following form."
67. UHCDA § 4 pt. 4.
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This is by far the most commonly occurring situation today because so
few patients have advance directives.6"
A. Ranking
After recognizing the authority of an orally designated surrogate,
section 5 affirms the legitimacy of close family decisionmaking by pro-
viding a list of authorized surrogates in the following order of priority:
(1) the spouse, unless legally separated; (2) an adult child; (3) a par-
ent; or (4) an adult brother or sister.69
The section also recognizes the legitimacy of a close friend as sur-
rogate if none of the above family members are available:
If none of the individuals eligible to act as surrogate under
subsection (b) is reasonably available, an adult who has ex-
hibited special care and concern for the patient, who is fa-
miliar with the patient's personal values, and who is
reasonably available may act as surrogate.7 °
No special procedure is required to establish the status of any
surrogate relationship, although the Act authorizes providers to re-
quire, at their discretion, "a written declaration under penalty of per-
jury stating facts and circumstances reasonably sufficient to establish
the claimed authority."71 The only limitation on who may act as surro-
gate is the same as that applied to agents.72 Unless related to the pa-
tient, a surrogate may not be an owner, operator, or employee of a
residential long-term health care institution.7h
In case of disagreement among surrogates of equal priority, the
Act establishes majority rule.7 4 If the surrogates are evenly divided,
however, the process comes to a halt.75 This leaves guardianship as
the last resort.76 It is noteworthy that, while the majority rule ap-
proach is commonly used in state surrogate consent statutes, there is
little or no evidence that it provides a workable solution. Query how
many health care providers will proceed with a termination of treat-
ment if even one of a group of authorized surrogates expresses strong
68. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
69. UHCDA § 5(b).
70. Id. § 5(c).
71. Id. § 5(j).
72. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
73. UHCDA § 5(i).
74. Id. § 5(e).
75. Id. ("If the class is evenly divided concerning the health-care decision and the su-
pervising health-care provider is so informed, that class and all individuals having lower
priority are disqualified from making the decision.").
76. Id. § 5(e) cmt.
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opposition. It may be that legislators find majority rule appealing as a
sound legal notion, although in the grit and mire of health decision-
making, only consensus-building may actually work. This is one area
that cries out for further research into decisionmaking processes, in-
cluding the use of ethics committees and other dispute resolution
mechanisms.
The remaining components of section 5 reiterate the substituted
judgment/best interests standard for decisionmaking" and the au-
thority of surrogates to act without judicial approval.7" Subsection (h)
recognizes a right that is certainly implied in many advance directive
laws, but which deserves to be made explicit, that is, a right to disqual-
ify any person from acting as one's surrogate, either by a signed writ-
ing or by personally informing the supervising health care provider.
79
B. Scope of Surrogate's Authority
Perhaps the most remarkable feature of the surrogate provisions
is what they do not include. Nowhere does the section place any limi-
tations or preconditions on the range of decisions, including deci-
sions about life support, that may be made by a surrogate on behalf of
a patient who has been determined by the primary physician to lack
capacity."0 Once again the Act rejects the protective approach found
in most surrogate statutes today, and instead, places substantial faith
in the authority of surrogates as the best way to reinforce patient
autonomy.
VII. SECrION 6-DECISIONS BY GUARDIANS
This brief section emphasizes the Act's intent to give priority in
health care decisionmaking to an agent over a guardian and to bind a
guardian to a ward's advance directive unless the appointing court
expressly authorizes otherwise." If a guardian with health care deci-
sionmaking authority does, in fact, assume the decisionmaking role,
section 6 clarifies that the guardian can make health care decisions
without returning to the court for judicial approval of specific deci-
77. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
78. See UHCDA § 5(f), (g).
79. Id. § 5(h).
80. One possible limitation, however, is included as an optional provision in § 13(e) of
the Act. The optional language recognizes a limitation on an agent's or surrogate's au-
thority to admit an individual to a mental health institution, absent express authorization.
Id. § 13(e). The comment to § 13(e) recognizes that states may have such limitations al-
ready operative in separate mental health commitment statutes, but that they may wish to
address the issue in this Act. Id. § 13(e) cmt.
81. Id. § 6(a), (b).
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sions.8 2 The comment recognizes that "[c]ourts have no particular ex-
pertise with respect to health-care decision making. Moreover, the
delay attendant upon seeking court approval may undermine the ef-
fectiveness of the decision ultimately made."
83
VIII. SECTION 7-OBLIGATIONS OF HEALTH CARE PROVIDER
This section spells out certain notification and recording obliga-
tions of providers. The heart of the section, however, is the provider's
obligation to comply with an individual's advance directive. The basic
mandate of section 7(d) requires the provider to comply with an indi-
vidual instruction of the patient; comply with a reasonable interpreta-
tion of that instruction by an authorized agent, surrogate, or
guardian; and comply with a health care decision made by an author-
ized agent, surrogate, or guardian.84
Two exceptions may arise to vitiate this mandate. First, like most
advance directive statutes, the UHCDA includes a conscience excep-
tion, but with fairly stringent requirements.8 5 Both individuals and
institutions may raise conscience objections to the mandate. In the
case of institutions, the objection is considered valid only if
the instruction or decision is contrary to a policy of the insti-
tution which is expressly based on reasons of conscience and
if the policy was timely communicated to the patient or to a
person then authorized to make health-care decisions for the
patient.8 6
The second exception permits individual providers and institu-
tions to decline to comply with an individual instruction or decision
"that requires medically ineffective health care or health care contrary
to generally accepted health-care standards." 7 The term "medically
ineffective" is not defined by the Act, so whether it adds anything be-
yond the already fluid meaning of "generally accepted health-care
standards" is doubtful. Had the drafters chosen to define "medically
ineffective," they would have opened a definitional mire because the
term is subject to differing and volatile views that trigger debate over
82. Id. § 6(c).
83. Id. § 6 cmt.
84. Id. § 7(d).
85. Id. § 7(e).
86. Id.
87. Id. § 7(f).
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larger issues of rationing, resource allocation, and definitions of futile
treatment.
88
If the provider or institution asserts either exception, it must ful-
fill three attendant responsibilities: (1) inform the patient and surro-
gate promptly; (2) provide continuing care until a transfer can be
effected; and (3) "make all reasonable efforts to assist in the transfer
of the patient to another health-care provider or institution that is
willing to comply with the instruction or decision." 9 Despite the obli-
gation to "make all reasonable efforts," the provision still leaves indi-
viduals vulnerable to noncomplying providers in locales in which
transfer to another provider is difficult or impossible. The drafters
had considered mandating an ultimatum-either transfer the patient
or comply with the advance directive/surrogate decision-but re-
jected such a mandate in deference to provider concerns. 90
IX. OTHER MATTERS
The remaining sections of the Act address several other issues:
" Immunities. The Act provides broad protection from liability for ac-
tions taken in good faith by both providers and persons acting as
agents or surrogates. 91
" Statutory Damages. An individual may seek statutory damages against
a provider who intentionally violates the Act or who commits certain
intentional acts, such as falsifying or forging an advance directive or
a revocation of an advance directive.92 Minimum statutory damages
are left to the discretion of adopting states.93 The drafters chose
not to include criminal penalties out of a recognition that prosecu-
tions are unlikely to occur.94 Unless the civil damages are substan-
tial, they likewise are unlikely to be used.95
" Judicial Relief A brief and limited judicial relief provision authorizes
those with a direct interest in a patient's care (i.e., the patient,
88. The Maryland Health Care Decisions Act defines "medically ineffective treatment"
as treatment that, 'to a reasonable degree of medical certainty .... will not: (1) Prevent or
reduce the deterioration of the health of an individual; or (2) Prevent the impending
death of an individual.' MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-601(n) (1994).
89. UHCDA § 7 (g).
90. Id. The New York Health Care Proxy Act provides a model for the ultimatum ap-
proach. It provides: 'If such a transfer [of the patient] is not effected, the hospital shall
seek judicial relief or honor the agent's decision.' N.Y PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2984 (McKin-
ney Supp. 1991).
91. UHCDA § 9.
92. Id. § 10.
93. Id. § 10 cmt.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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agent, guardian, surrogate, health care provider, or institution in-
volved with the patient's care) to seek injunctive or other equitable
relief as needed.96 The comment urges legislators to cross-refer-
ence the section to the state's rules on expedited proceedings or
rules on proceedings affecting incapacitated persons.97
* Effect of the Act and Other Administrative Provisions. Several boilerplate
provisions, common to advance directive laws, relate to matters such
as presumptions of the intent of individuals who have not com-
pleted any advance directive,98 a prohibition against treating a
death resulting from compliance with the Act as a suicide or homi-
cide,99 the disavowal of mercy killing, assisted suicide, and euthana-
sia, 100 and the recognition of copies of advance directives.101
CONCLUSION
The Uniform Health Care Decisions Act represents a quantum
leap in thinking since the enactment of the now-defunct URTIA in
terms of scope, flexibility, comprehension, and affirmation of per-
sonal autonomy. Despite the flaws described in this Article, it offers a
clear vision of the direction in which health care decisions legislation
needs to move. If not a health care decisions superhighway, the Act is
at least an avenue for patient autonomy. Some will criticize it as an
aberration that tramples the protections currently afforded vulnerable
persons. But those criticisms go to the Act's basic assumptions, not to
its structure and operation. If one agrees with its assumptions, one
must admit that it remains remarkably true to its premises. The Act
arrives on the scene, however, at a time in which most states have al-
ready embraced one or more statutory schemes governing advance
directives. Fewer have surrogate or family consent statutes. 10 2 Major
96. Id. § 14.
97. Id. § 14 cmt. The comment also refers legislators to the NATIONAL CENTER FOR
STATE COURTS, GUIDFELINES FOR STATE COURT DECISION MAKING IN LIFE-SusTAINING MEDI-
CAL TREATMENT CASES (2d ed. 1992)
98. UHCDA § 13(a). The Act "does not create a presumption concerning the inten-
tion of an individual who has not made or who has revoked an advance health-care direc-
tive." Id.
99. Id. § 13(b). Such a death does not "legally impair or invalidate a policy of insur-
ance or an annuity providing a death benefit, notwithstanding any term of the policy or
annuity to the contrary." Id.
100. Id. § 13(c).
101. Id. § 12. "A copy of a written advance health-care directive... has the same effect
as the original." Id.
102. See Choice In Dying, Inc., Statutes Authorizing Surrogate Decisionmaking, IGHT-To-DIE
L. DIG. (Dec. 1993) (showing that 25 states and the District of Columbia had enacted such
legislation as of January 1994).
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legislative change is not easy for a state in this posture. Perhaps the
most compelling fact in favor of acceptance of the UHCDA is the frag-
mentation, complexity, and variability of state health decisions law.
Confusion, is, after all, the raison ditre of uniform acts.
